Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher.
Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?
Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.
-
There has been substantial recent concern that pricing algorithms might learn to ``collude.'' Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish their competitors who refuse to support high prices, and these strategies can be automatically learned. In fact, a standard economic intuition is that supra-competitive prices emerge from either the use of threats, or a failure of one party to optimize their payoff. Is this intuition correct? Would preventing threats in algorithmic decision-making prevent supra-competitive prices when sellers are optimizing for their own revenue? No. We show that supra-competitive prices can emerge even when both players are using algorithms which do not encode threats, and which optimize for their own revenue. We study sequential pricing games in which a first mover deploys an algorithm and then a second mover optimizes within the resulting environment. We show that if the first mover deploys any algorithm with a no-regret guarantee, and then the second mover even approximately optimizes within this now static environment, monopoly-like prices arise. The result holds for any no-regret learning algorithm deployed by the first mover and for any pricing policy of the second mover that obtains them profit at least as high as a random pricing would -- and hence the result applies even when the second mover is optimizing only within a space of non-responsive pricing distributions which are incapable of encoding threats. In fact, there exists a set of strategies, neither of which explicitly encode threats that form a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous pricing game in algorithm space, and lead to near monopoly prices. This suggests that the definition of ``algorithmic collusion'' may need to be expanded, to include strategies without explicitly encoded threats.more » « lessFree, publicly-accessible full text available January 1, 2026
-
We describe WiSER, a clean-slate search engine designed to exploit high-performance SSDs with the philosophy "read as needed". WiSER utilizes many techniques to deliver high throughput and low latency with a relatively small amount of main memory; the techniques include an optimized data layout, a novel two-way cost-aware Bloom filter, adaptive prefetching, and space-time trade-offs. In a system with memory that is significantly smaller than the working set, these techniques increase storage space usage (up to 50%), but reduce read amplification by up to 3x, increase query throughput by up to 2.7x, and reduce latency by 16x when compared to the state-of-the-art Elasticsearch. We believe that the philosophy of "read as needed" can be applied to more applications as the read performance of storage devices keeps improving.more » « less
An official website of the United States government

Full Text Available